Abstract-IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) plays as a core platform in next-generation-network architecture, which advocates for an open and inter-operable service infrastructure. However, over the years, not much attention has been paid to the security problem of IMS. The time has come to now address security issues. This paper proposes a multi-attribute stereo model based on X.805 standard, which addresses a comprehensive, top-down, end-to-end perspective for IMS security analysis, classification and assessment. Besides, a detailed threat analysis of IMS is demonstrated and the vulnerability utilized by the threat is also presented.
I. INTRODUCTION
The telecom industry has entered a phase of revolutionary change as Internet technologies are enabling a new era of multimedia services that are dramatically changing business models. The IP Multimedia Subsystem (IMS) [1] defined by the 3rd Generation Partnership Project(3GPP) aims to provide access-independent multimedia services in a distributed architecture. The IMS is the core of NGN, and it performs as a session and service control platform. As a result of the move to IP-based open system architecture, telecom carriers face a range of new security threats and operational challenges that directly impact the business. There also exits security problems in IMS that has yet to be solved.
Due to the layered architecture and complexity of IMS, existing security analysis approaches designed for the Internet or the traditional telecom system can not be directly applied to solve security related problems of IMS. The work of Frank et.al. [2] focused on the individual components' threats. Wang et.al. [3] presented an approach to describe security issues of IMS. However, neither of them took the layered structure and the peculiarity of IMS into consideration. This paper proposes a multi-attribute stereo model for IMS security analysis, based on the reference architecture of ITU-T X.805 [4] and the threat concept of STRIDE model [5] . This model provides a systematic method for security analysis of IMS.
This paper starts with a brief description of the IMS infrastructure, ITU-T X.805 standard and STRIDE threat model. Section III discusses and proposes a multiattribute stereo model for IMS security analysis. Section IV covers security analysis using this model. We also give an explanation to some of the particular threat scenarios. Section V states how to using the model for further study and section VI concludes.
II. BACKGROUND

A. IMS Architecture
The mobile industry originally created the IMS based on the SIP protocol [6] , to enable value-added revenuegenerating services for third-generation networks. But it is now being developed as the core of the NGN and a unified service architecture that allows fixed-mobile convergence. Fig. 1 depicts the IMS network architecture, which can be further divided into three layers: the user layer, session control layer, and application layer.
 The user layer provides for termination of signaling to end points, routing and control of bearer traffic.  The session control layer handles the registration of endpoints and routing of SIP messages to the appropriate application servers.  The application layer comprises application servers which provide IMS customers with services such as Presence, Instant message, and Push to talk. The CSCF function is divided into three parts. The proxy CSCF (P-CSCF) is the first contact point for a SIP endpoint to gain access to IMS. The interrogating CSCF (I-CSCF) provides the entrance to the home domain, and assigns a S-CSCF for a particular user by querying HSS. The serving CSCF (S-CSCF) functions include SIP registration of endpoints, end user authentication, session and service control, and call monitoring and recording for charging.
HSS is similar to HLR in 2G, which is a database containing subscriber data. HSS exchanges information with the S-CSCF and I-CSCF using the Diameter protocol.
MGCF/MGW provides the protocol and media conversion of the intercommunication between CS domain and IMS.
B. ITU-T Recommendation X.805
The ITU-T Recommendation X.805 [4] security architecture was developed as part of the ITU-T X.800 series of recommendations to provide a methodical, organized way of addressing the five threats to telecommunications networks. The X.800 series identifies these threats as:
 Destruction of information and/or other resources  Corruption or modification of information  Removal, theft, or loss of information and/or other resources  Disclosure of information, and  Interruption of services. Fig. 2 depicts the X.805 security architecture. It addresses a comprehensive, top-down, end-to-end perspective of network security and can be applied to network in order to predict, detect, and correct security vulnerabilities.
The X.805 standard defines a hierarchy of network equipment and facility groupings into three security layers: the infrastructure security layer, the services security layer, and the applications security layer :
There are three types of activities performed on network, which are represented by the three security planes: the management plane, the control plane, and the end user plane.
A security dimension is a set of security measures designed to address a particular aspect of the network security. This recommendation identifies eight such sets: access control, authentication, non-repudiation, data confidentiality, communication flow security, data integrity, availability, and privacy.
C. STRIDE Threat Model
A working knowledge of categories of threats can assist in organizing a security strategy so that responses can be planned to threats. Threats faced by the application can be categorized according to the goals and purposes of the attacks. STRIDE [5] is the acronym used at Microsoft to distinguish different threats, which offers a complete and distinct way of threat categorizing. STRIDE stands for: Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information Disclosure, Denial of Service, and Elevation of Privilege.
III. MULTI-ATTRIBUTE STEREO MODEL FOR IMS
3GPP IMS security framework drafts series of security specifications to protect IMS network from attacks [7, 8] . However IMS networks have built-in operational challenges that make them very vulnerable to attacks. To some extent such vulnerabilities can be taken into consideration as networks are designed, however, a certain level of uncertainty remains on best practices for effectively securing an IMS infrastructure. Security problem has been a great obstacle to rapid commercial application of the IMS. A systematic procedure is required to analyze the security threats faced by services, to identify the applicable security technology and to understand its relevance with QoS.
ITU-T X.805 can be used to augment the security specifications to provide comprehensive, end-to-end security by including the IMS control plane as well as its management, and end user planes. However, the eight dimensions defined in ITU-T X.805 are not suitable for the analysis of IMS. Take the access control dimension and the authentication dimension for example, access control depends on authentication to achieve its security objective, and authentication techniques may be required as part of access control.
To study IMS security in a clear and systematic way, the model adopted should make sure that the dimension which addresses a particular aspect of the security is orthogonal and complete. Combined with the six types of threats in STRIDE modeling and the particularity of IMS security issues, six security dimensions are proposed in this paper. Table I provides a mapping of security dimension to the security threat specified in STRIDE.
1) Authentication:
It is a feature that IMS network should provide a two-way authentication mechanism with high security level. That is IMS network not only prevent illegal users from obtaining permissions or services, but also can be authenticated by users.
2)
Integrity: It ensures the correctness or accuracy of data. The data is protected against unauthorized modification, deletion, creation, replication and is provided with an indication of these unauthorized activities.
3) Non-repudiation: It provides means for preventing an individual or entity from denying having performed a particular action by making available proof of various network-related actions. For example, the billing in IMS should be reliable and accurate such that no user can deny the expense recorded by the system.
4)
Confidentiality: It refers to limiting information access and disclosure to only authorized users, as well as preventing access by, or disclosure to, unauthorized ones.
5)
Availability: It ensures that there is no denial of legitimate access to network elements, stored information, information flows, services and applications due to events impacting the network. Disaster recovery solutions are also included in this category.
6)
Authorization: It ensures that IMS can estimate whether users' demands to utilize the service or access to the network are legal according to the users' profile and local policy. Fig. 3 depicts the security model for IMS security analysis. The multi-attribute stereo model not only satisfies the requirements for the comprehensive study, but also fits the characteristics of IMS.
In IMS, the infrastructure layer comprises network entities, such as CSCF, MRFP, HSS, and MGCF. They are the fundamental elements which complete IMS function. The service layer consists of service provided by IMS which enable users to receive basic connectivity and transport from IMS operator. The application layer focuses on network-based application provided through IMS. Mostly applied application includes Presence, Instant Message, and Push to talk. The management plane of IMS concerns about the administration, billing, and QoS. The control plane is about activities related to delivery of control information, services and applications across the network. SIP and H.248/Megaco are the typical protocol that helps the service provision of IMS. The end-user plane addresses aspects of actual end-user data flows, that is the audio and video flow from user.
IV. THREAT ANALYSIS OF IMS
Identifying potential security threats is best approached by analyzing the threat in terms of benefits that can be realized by the attacker, the technical sophistication required to carry out an attack, and the impact of the attack. In this section, assets in IMS will be checked and categorized. Then the six security dimensions discussed above will be applied to assets in different module of network security, and threat scenarios will be illustrated.
Anything that has value to the organization can be regarded as an asset. Therefore, assets in IMS will be checked and categorized by security layers and planes. Table II shows the assets in IMS. Both the physical assets (network entity) and the logical assets (the information stored in the physical assets) in IMS are included. In the access authentication of IMS, UE does not certificate the IMS entry point -P-CSCF, which provides an opportunity for attacker to impersonate a middleman. An adversary can sniffer the traffic between UE and P-CSCF and send back a forged 302 SIP message [6] to UE once the UE sends out an INVITE. The 302 will redirect the UE's traffic to a manipulated machine in which the Contact and Via header fields can be replaced by the adversary's IP address and port number. This procedure can tamper UE's register address to the adversary's, and so legal identity can be hijacked.
2) Media Redirection Attack  Security Layer: Application layer  Security Plane: End user plane  Impact: Loss of service SDP carried by SIP message is used for media negotiation. The "c" and "m" parameters reveal the connection information and medida description, name and address [9] . If an adversary modifies these parameters to his own data. For example, alter the connection information to his IP address. Then, the caller or callee's media packets will be delivered to the adversary.
3) Instant Message Spoofing  Security Layer: Service layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Fraud of client's trust
The majority of SIP end-users' terminals displays incoming call identity by reading From header of SIP message. As shown in Fig. 4 , under the circumstances that IMS has absence of IPsec protection between UE and P-CSCF, an adversary can construct an MESSAGE SIP packet with forged address and identity of UE A. The IMS network will not find out and UE B will consider this instant message as UE A's.
4) Man In the Middle P-CSCF Attack
 Security Layer: Services layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Service manipulation UE finds its accessing P-CSCF by DNS query or other measures. An adversary may pretend to be a fake P-CSCF using DNS distorting method and acts as a man-inthe-middle entity. Subsequently, all messages transferred between the UE and the real IMS core network will pass through the entity. The impersonative entiy can manipulate the message according to its own policy. The scenario is shown in Fig. 5 . For example it can simply drop the REGISTER SIP message from specific user. Then this set of user can not using any service provided by IMS. It also can shield particular users from calling by neglecting INVITE SIP messages sent to the users.
5) Dictionary Attack
 Security Layer: Application layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Identity Hijacking A soft terminal installed on PC or smart phone can also make use of services provide by the IMS core network. This type of subscriber authenticate itself using password instead of built in ISIM. Many people have a tendency to choose passwords which are short (7 characters or fewer), single words found in dictionaries or simple, easilypredicted variations on words, such as appending a digit to their name. A dictionary attack is a technique for defeating a cipher or authentication mechanism by trying to determine its decryption key or passphrase by searching likely possibilities. Our experiment uder Open IMS Core testbed verifies that dictionary attack can be easily achieved since AKA MD5 algorithm is easily accessible.
B. Integrity 1) SIP BYE Attack
 Security Layer: Services layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Session disruption
If an adversary obtains the necessary parameters such as Call-ID of a session by monitoring Gm reference point, and then construct a forged SIP BYE request to CSCF, the session will be torn down as Fig. 6 shows. Thus, IMS users can not communicate normally. Similar to SIP BYE Attack, an adversary can also forge a fake SIP CANCEL request to the callee before the phone is picked up. The connection will be destroyed.
3) SQL Code Injection  Security Layer: Services layer  Security Plane: User plane  Impact: User data disruption
In order to enable communication among users, SIP introduces various types of messages similarly to the HTTP message structure. SIP messages must identify the requested resource, which corresponds to a unique address. In registration procedure, S-CSCF has to retrieve user related information from HSS.
If It is clear that the latter statement will delete all user tables. This kind of attack will be a disaster to the IMS, since important subscription data is affected .
4) RTP Injection
 Security Layer: Services layer  Security Plane: User plane  Impact: Session disruption IMS adopts the Real-Time Transport Protocol (RTP), a transport protocol of real-time applications for transmitting encoded audio and video data. Each RTP packet includes an identifier (SSRC), a sequence number and a timestamp to indentify the freshness degree of the packet. If an adversary adapts the header field to be slightly ahead of the eavesdropped data, the forged RTP will be displayed instead of the users' real message.
Experiments also show that simplified version of the voice injection attack is still working with most implementations when identifiers of the RTP header is not included [11] .
5) RTCP Bye Attack  Security Layer: Services layer  Security Plane: User plane  Impact: Session disruption SSRC acts as an identifier for the RTP packet, which is unique during a session. Once a sender of RTP detects the same SSRC of other senders, it will send a RTCP BYE message to the reciever and alter its own SSRC value. Fig.  7 illustrate the attack scenario.
6) DNS Cache Poisioning
 Security Layer: Infrastructure layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Loss of service P-CSCF and other network entities are discovered by the domain name. Therefore, IMS services depend on DNS. DNS usually cached the frequently queried information for efficiency. DNS cache poisoning consists of changing or adding records in the resolver caches, either on the client or the server, so that a DNS query for a domain returns an IP address for an attacker's domain instead of the intended domain. If an adversary destroyed the DNS entry related to the IMS entity, service could not be provided normally and the session may be directed to the attacker. Fig.8 . Then the caller sends a CANCEL message to the callee, the call is abolished and no bill can be charged [2] . However the caller gets the callee's address information and can communicate by sending a direct INVITE.
2) Media Theft
 Security Layer: Infrastructure layer  Security Plane: Management plane  Impact: Toll fraud
In normal condition, UE will release media stream and stop transferring RTP packets once it receives or sends a BYE request. At the same time, CSCF will consider the session is terminated and stop accounting. If two tailored terminals don't release the media stream after the session stops, UEs can continue the session and achieve the purpose of fee evasion. It is called media theft.
D. Confidentiality 1) Network Topology Disclosure
 Security Layer: Infrastructure layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Leak of network topology Network topology is the physical or logical arrangement and interconnections of the elements of a computer network. SIP message contains header fields about the routing information to route the following message correctly.
Via header reveals the information of network elements, such as I-CSCF and S-CSCF. IMS entities add their IP addresses and port numbers to the Via header in the request SIP message ensuring that the response will return to the source along with the original path. Similar header fields include Route, Record-Route and ServiceRoute.
SDP in SIP contains IP address and port number for receiving RTP packets, which provides enough information for media negotiation. When a IMS user calls a PLMN user or a IMS user utilizes Conference like application, media stream needs to be processed by IM-MGW or MRFP, and therefore address related information will be exposed in SDP.
An adversary who gets this type of SIP message will gain knowledge about the topology of the practical arrangement of IMS, and launch further attack.
2) SIP Information Sniff  Security Layer: Application layer  Security Plane: User plane  Impact: Leak of users' sensitive information SIP is encoded in text manner and the practically deployed IMS uses inadequate security protection in order to assure its simplicity and efficience. AKA mechanism guarantees encryption and integrity between UE and P-CSCF. However the first REGISTER SIP message is sent before the security key is negotiated, which makes it under no protection. An adversary can easily capture and analyze the content of SIP message in plain-texted communication line. Request-URI of INVITE message reveals the object the user talks to and so frequency of call can be obtained. MESSAGE exposed the content of instant message. By investigating such SIP packets as mentioned above, adversary can get information like user's privacy and the commercial secrets.
3) RTP Information Sniff  Security Layer: Application layer  Security Plane: User plane  Impact: Leak of users' sensitive information Although specifications are available, encryption is still not widely adopted in VoIP products. Recently, most of the RTP implementations in IMS did not provide confidentiality of the media stream by default or at all.
Due to the lack of secrecy mechanisms in the used IMS endpoints, it is straightforward for an adversary to eavesdrop to the ongoing conversation using any VoIP enabled network analyzators. What's more, the SDP part of SIP message reveals the RTP and RTCP port numbers used for voice transportation, which makes it easy to filter relevant RTP packets. E. Availablity 1) SIP Flood  Security Layer: Infrastructure layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Loss of QoS for the legitimate users Most of flood attack aims to exhaust server's resource including but not limited to network bandwidth, processor cycles, or disk space, which prevents the server from providing legitimate users with normal services. A great amount of any kind of SIP message, which could cause one or more responses from IMS, may result in a significant impact on the server capability in an IMS environment. Here we take REGISTER as an example. IMS needs to deal with a lot of message interaction in the register process [3] . A registration flood occurs when attackers send large quantity of REGISTER messages simultaneously. An initial REGISTER request will get many network elements involved and different messages produced. To make matters worse, P-CSCF and S-CSCF are stateful SIP proxies, they should maintain the state of every REGISTER message. Network servers have finite processing capability and can therefore handle a limited amount of traffic. The detailed process of IMS register is shown in Fig. 9 . If the volume of registration messages exceeds the device's capacity, some messages from legal users will be dropped, meaning some users will not be able to make or receive calls. These devices may then attempt the registration again, adding more congestion. Depending on the design of the network, the performance of network devices, and severity of the registration flood, users may be unable to access the network for several minutes or several hours. Without doubt, the similar situation will occur, when REGISTER is replaced by other SIP messages such as INVITE, OPTIONS.
2) SIP Parse Attack  Security Layer: Infrastructure layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Loss of service for the legitimate users IMS utilizes SIP as the main control protocol. The HTTP-like ASCII presentation of the SIP messages may initially be more attractive to attackers for vulnerability assessment than the rival signaling protocols with complex encodings. Malformed or sequence disordered SIP messages are used to exploit vulnerabilities in SIP parser implementations to crash the IMS servers or endusers' terminals.
3) SIP State Attack  Security Layer: Infrastructure layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Loss of service for the legitimate users SIP is a stateful protocol and many SIP implementations in IMS are stateful. Thus, the attack aiming at the state machine of an SIP implementation may lead it to suspend. The constraints about the relationship of SIP messages are described in RFC 3261. Any exception against these constraints is designed to confuse the state machine in an SIP implementation. There are several kinds of such attack. An important one is sequence disordered messages. For example, an INVITE message immediately followed by CANCEL may results in the confusion of a SIP terminal. Another one is malformed SIP message with wrong semantic. For example, following a request message with CSeq number as 5, a request with CSeq number as 4 is not compliant with semantic and may confuse the state machine of a SIP implementation.
4) Mixed Attack
 Security Layer: Infrastructure layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Loss of service for the legitimate users Considering the impact on IMS, no matter it aims to crash SIP parser or confuse the state machine, a malformed SIP message may consume more capability of an SIP implementation than a normal one. So, the combination of SIP Flood and SIP Parse Attack or SIP state Attack may have a more significant influence on the IMS. As we carried out SIP flood with normal INVITE message against an test IMS network, the impact on IMS is that the utilization of CPU rises, however, the SIP sever did not crash. And also we carried out an control experiment, SIP flood with malformed INVITE message. It turns out that not only does the utilization of CPU rise sharply and exceed that in the experiment with normal INVITE message, but also the SIP server crashes several times. The result provides that the mixed attack is much more efficacious.
5) HTTP Parse Attack  Security Layer: Infrastructure layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Loss of service for the legitimate users The Ut interface between UE and AS uses HTTP as its transmission protocol, which enables users to manage their configuration for customized service (presence, multi-party conference application etc.). The deployment data is sent to the server via the POST method and its ContentLength field indicates size of the data. If the ContentLength is set to be a extremely large by malicious users, the AS's memory may be exhausted.
6) Malicious Network Deregistration  Security Layer: Service layer  Security Plane: Control plane  Impact: Loss of service for the legitimate users In IMS, deregistration not only can be initiated by UE, but also can be launched by an administrative network. It happens when the timer expires, policy changes or the service control needs to do so. Fig. 10 shows the deregistration procedure initiated by the service platform. An adversary can impersonate a network entity and inform the UE of deregistration. Then the service will not be accessed by the user. Attackers can seize root or super-user's privilege by making use of the system's security leak or social engineering. For example, user's service subscription can be modified once attacker get super privilege of accessing HSS's database, which may result in illegal user gaining extra service or legal subscriber losing normal service.
2) Implicit Registration Attack
As per 3GPP, Multiple Public User Identities can be registered implicitly (registered and deregistered simultaneously) using a single public id which is part of an implicit set of public ids, by means of the implicit registration functionality.
An adversary can gain the rights to edit subscriber's data and add himself to the implicit registration set as shown in Fig. 11 . Once the user register, the adversary will also be registered successfully and use the service which he has no rights to.
V. USING THE MODEL
In designing the above model, we considered attacks from the perspective of Security Layer, Security Plane and Impact. How can this model be used?
A 
VI. CONCLUSION
Security is arguably one of the primary concerns and will determine the future of IMS deployment. This paper proposes a multi-attribute stereo model for IMS security analysis based on ITU-T Recommendation X.805 and STRIDE threat model, which provides a comprehensive and systematic perspective of IMS. A threat analysis of IMS network is made by adopting the model. Future work includes quantifying evaluation of IMS security and applying the model in real world applications to predict, detect, and correct security vulnerabilities.
